# china

**Rudolf et al. 15** – (Moritz, esearch Associate at the Mercator Institute for China Studies, Marc Julienne, & Johannes Buckow, “China's Counterterrorism Campaign Goes Global,” http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/chinas-counterterrorism-campaign-goes-global/)

With China developing into a more proactive player in Asian political and economic affairs, China and its citizens both at home and abroad will increasingly be targeted by Islamist terrorism in the years to come. With higher stakes at play in volatile regions such as Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, China is forced to become more active in the global fight against terrorism. Beijing’s recent attempts to mediate between Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Pakistan not only underline its expanding reach and growing maturity in global affairs but also its potential weight in crucial international anti-terrorism efforts.

# disad

## overview

**Flawed response measures and emotional panic means retaliation – it’s an explicit goal of terrorist attacks.**

**Montgomery 09** – (2009, Evan Braden, Research Fellow, has published on a range of issues, including alliance politics, nuclear terrorism, military doctrine, and political revolutions, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, MA in Foreign Affairs, PhD Candidate at UVA, “Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Developing a Response,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA506768)

In the wake of a nuclear explosion, both the government and the general public would also be preoccupied with the possibility that additional attacks might occur, much as they were in the aftermath of 9/11. Indeed, this fear might be quite justiﬁed; as Ashton Carter has argued, “**If one bomb goes off, there are likely to be more to follow**.”105 Given the difﬁculty of acquiring even a single intact nuclear weapon or the ﬁssile material necessary to build one, this is not a foregone conclusion. What can almost certainly be expected, however, are multiple claims of responsibility and threats of future attacks.106 Unfortunately, **even ﬁctitious claims and false alarms can have signiﬁcant, and extremely costly, effects**. While some threats might easily be dismissed as apocryphal, the grave consequences of ignoring these claims and being proven incorrect would require many and perhaps all of them to be investigated. Doing so, however, would further tax government agencies already occupied with preventing subsequent attacks, determining who was responsible for the attack, and formulating a response both at home and abroad. Moreover, the heightened possibility of follow-on attacks also increases the likelihood that preemptive emergency measures such as evacuations would be taken in cities throughout the country, which would in turn require additional time, effort, and resources on the part of a severely overstretched government.107

To these concerns, one can also add the possible psychological, strategic, and political consequences of a nuclear explosion. The very idea of a nuclear attack on American soil, along with the graphic images such an attack would produce, **could lead to widespread panic and a tremendous loss of conﬁdence in government**, especially if response efforts were handled poorly.108

The public reaction to an attack could also include emotional demands for retaliation that might be ill advised, given that a recurring goal for terrorists generally and al Qaeda and its afﬁliates in particular is to incite a reprisal, or even to **spark a wider interstate war between their enemies**. For example, one of the key goals bin Laden hoped to achieve with the 9/11 attacks was to provoke an American invasion of Afghanistan, which he calculated would be as protracted and draining for the United States as it had been for the Soviet Union two decades earlier.109 Another al Qaeda plot — one that was never carried out — envisioned recruiting pilots from the Saudi Royal Air Force to steal their own ﬁghter jets and conduct a rogue attack against Israel, in the hope that this would instigate another Arab-Israeli war.110 Should a nuclear terrorist attack ever occur, the perpetrators could have similar motives.

**Delivery into the US is impossible to stop – too many border crossings**

**Bunn and Wier 06** (Matthew Bunn & Anthony Wier, on the staff of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, are the coauthors of Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (2004). “The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism,” Harvard Belfer Center, available for download here: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/658/seven\_myths\_of\_nuclear\_terrorism.html)

While some investment in improving border detection capabilities is certainly worthwhile, this last line of defense will always be a very porous one. The physics of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, the geography of the huge and complex American borders, and the economics of the global flow of people and goods conspire to make the terrorists’ job easy and the defenders’ job very difficult. Once stolen, the nuclear material for a bomb could be any- where, and it is very difficult to detect, especially if shielding is used to limit radiation emissions. Typical nuclear weapons are not large, and could readily be smuggled across America’s or other nations’ borders. The nuclear material needed for a bomb could easily fit in a suitcase. Even an assembled bomb could fit in a van, a cargo container, or a yacht sailed into a US harbor. Or the materials could be smuggled in and the bomb built at the site of its intended use. Terrorists have routinely used truck bombs that were physically larger than even a crude terrorist nuclear bomb would need to be. America’s borders stretch for thousands of miles, and millions of trucks, trains, ships, and airplanes in which nuclear material might be hidden cross them every year. Hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants and thousands of tons of illegal drugs cross US borders every year, despite billions of dollars of investment in trying to stop them. (Some have said that the easiest way to bring nuclear material into the United States would be to hide it in a bale of marijuana.) Every nation’s border is vulnerable to various types of illicit movement, be it drugs, terrorists, or the material needed to unleash nuclear terror. The radiation from plutonium, and especially from HEU, is weak and difficult to detect at any significant distance, particularly if the material is surrounded with shielding. Technology does exist, and is being further developed, to make it possible to detect HEU or plutonium in objects right in front of the detectors (as might be possible at controlled border crossings), including finding hidden nuclear material in everything from airline baggage to cargo containers. Programs are now under way to put these kinds of detection capabilities into place at an increasing number of sites. But these capabilities should not be exaggerated. While US Customs officers have been equipped with “radiation pagers,” these would have essentially no chance of detecting HEU with even minor shielding, even if it were in a bag directly in front of the inspector. More sophisticated equipment that can detect both HEU and plutonium is being purchased—but it will be years before such equipment is installed and in use at all the major ports and border crossings into the United States. Two points are crucial to understand. First, inspecting cargo as it arrives in the United States is not good enough: if a bomb were on a boat sailing into a major US harbor, it could wreak horrible devastation before the ship ever pulled up to the dock to be inspected. That is why many of the new initiatives after the 9-11 attacks involve putting detectors in place at foreign ports that ship to the United States. But it will take an immense and continuing effort to ensure that detection at these ports is effective, that there are no ready possibilities for bribing a customs official to let a container through uninspected and that already inspected containers cannot be tampered with. Second, and more fundamentally, the number of possible pathways to smuggle a nuclear bomb or its ingredients into the United States is immense, and intelligent adversaries will choose whichever pathway remains undefended. If an effective system were put in place to make it very difficult to get nuclear material into the country in a cargo container without detection—and the country is a long way from that point today—then terrorists would bring their bomb in on a yacht, a fishing boat, or by some other means.

**Extinction**

**Myhrvold 14** - chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief technology officer at Microsoft   
Nathan P, Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action, cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic\_Terrorism\_corrected\_II.pdf

Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. Failing nation-states—like North Korea—which possess nuclear weapons potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less understood danger arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison. The ultimate response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result, they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists often hope to provoke reprisal attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S. would go so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived and adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually, the world will recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield weapons and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over the internet, and bombings in major cities. Strategic objectives cannot be far behind.

**We’ve used intel to catch backpack nukes – they kill intel which is a conceded internal link from the 1NC, no new 1AR answers – answers their UQ arg and proves we’re right.**

Meir 15 – Shalev Meir, Strategic Intelligence Service, 2015 (“Al Shabaab Threatening Kenya Using Nuclear Weapons, Police Device New Methods To Deter Attacks,” *Strategic Intelligence Service*, May 12th, <http://www.intelligencebriefs.com/al-shabaab-threatening-kenya-using-nuclear-weapons-police-device-new-methods-to-deter-attacks/>)

Kenya’s special undercover officers working with intelligence teams deterred Al Shabaab’s several backpack nuclear devices on transit to Nairobi destined for a massive nuclear attack, greater than the 1998 US bombing. The nuclear weapons which were being transported by one Musdaf Ismail Hashi, one of the most wanted Al Shabaab Mujahideen suicide bombers, was in various parts including detonating cords and blasting caps which is meant to provide “cover” for the delivery man. Intelligence teams who have been tracking the suspect say there were several suspicious telephone conversations between Hashi and one of the Al Shabaab leaders who was issuing him with instructions. Suitcase nukes, commonly known as suitcase bombs are often smuggled into countries, just like drugs and used by terrorists to conduct massive attacks. These nuclear weapons are designed to self-destruct if improperly opened. Security agents add that Hashi also had a mixture of explosives; RDX (44%), TNT (22%) and Potassium Nitrate (22%) which could have caused a massive damage killing close to 100,000 people. Kenya’s security system is on the lookout and more police are being trained to fast catch up with methods of detonating nuclear weapons which is now the suspected trend used by Al Shabaab militia group. Al Shabaab is set to revenge on Kenya through a massive attack following the death of their leader Adan Garar.

## at blowback

**Blowback arguments are wrong and contingent on other factors – drones are net-effective in reducing terrorist strength**

**Johnston and Sarbahi 15** – Patrick B. Johnston, Political Scientist at RAND Corporation, former fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Anoop K. Sarbahi, Political Science Professor at University of Minnesota, visiting scholar in the Department of Political Science at Stanford, formerly held pre- and post-doctoral positions at Harvard University and the University of California, Los Angeles, PhD in Political Science from UCLA, MPhil degree in Development Studies from the Indian Institute of Technology, Mumbai, 2015 (“The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” forthcoming *International Studies Quarterly*, April 21st, PDF, <http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf>)

Our findings also run counter to the implications of recent survey-based findings, which suggest that the harm inflicted by drone strikes on the civilian population has led to increased support for insurgents (Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013) or led to increased anti-Americanism (Kaltenthaler, Miller and Fair 2012). This is consistent with the radicalization mechanism underlying our hypothesis 1 discussed in Section 3.1. However, we did not find any observable evidence that supports this implication. Our findings suggest that the linkage between increased support for counterinsurgent or increased anti-Americanism, on the one hand, and terrorist attacks (or recruitment), on the other, is likely more complicated than usually hypothesized. The relationship is likely contingent on other factors such as the ability to operate without constant surveillance, likelihood of being killed (calculus of survival), presence of alternative modes of opposition, or other locally-specific factors. Sympathy for a cause or public anger at counterterrorist actions may not necessarily translate into the collective action necessary to observe an increase in active participation in militant activities that results in an escalation of terrorist attacks.

Given that drone strikes are associated with reductions in militant attacks in the areas where they occur, we also expect drone strikes to be negatively associated with the lethality, or “quality,” of militant attacks in these same areas. 35 This is indeed the case. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the estimate presented in column 5 of Table 3 suggests that the lethality of militant attacks declined by an average of nearly 25 percentage points in a given week in which a drone strike occurred. On average, 2.77 people were killed or injured in militant attacks in FATA between 2007 and the end of the third quarter of 2011. This figure would decline substantially to 1.73 per week as a result of a single drone strike if the number of drone strikes would increase by one per agency-week. 36

**Complex network analysis demonstrates the value of low-level targeted killing – casual observation can’t penetrate organization secrecy and should be ignored.**

**McNeal 13** – (2/25, Gregory, JD, professor at Pepperdine University, former Assistant Director of the Institute for Global Security, former legal consultant to the Chief Prosecutor of the Department of Defense Office of Military Commissions, “Kill-Lists and Network Analysis,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/kill-lists-and-network-analysis/)

NETWORK BASED ANALYSIS AND PATTERN OF LIFE SURVEILLANCE

To outside observers, some targets such as senior operational leaders are obviously worthy of placement on a kill-list, while the propriety of adding other persons to a kill-list may be more hotly disputed. While it may be clear that killing a bomb-maker (to draw from the example in my last post) is an obvious choice as it can create a gap in an enemy organization that may be hard to fill, removing other individuals (even if they are quickly replaced) may similarly pressure or disrupt terrorist organizations. As CIA director Hayden stated in 2009:

By making a safe haven feel less safe, we keep al-Qaeda guessing. We make them doubt their allies; question their methods, their plans, even their priorities… we force them to spend more time and resources on self-preservation, and that distracts them, at least partially and at least for a time, from laying the groundwork for the next attack.

When personnel within the targeting process are developing names for kill-lists, they will look beyond the criticality and vulnerability factors (described in my prior post) and will supplement that analysis with network based analysis. Networked based analysis looks at terrorist groups as nodes connected by links, and assesses how components of that terrorist network operate together and independently of one another. Those nodes and links, once identified will be targeted with the goal of disrupting and degrading their functionality. To effectively pursue a network based approach, bureaucrats rely in part on what is known as “pattern of life analysis” which involves connecting the relationships between places and people by tracking their patterns of life. This analysis draws on the interrelationships among groups “to determine the degree and points of their interdependence.” It assesses how activities are linked and looks to “determine the most effective way to influence or affect the enemy system.”

While the enemy moves from point to point, reconnaissance or surveillance tracks and notes every location and person visited. Connections between the target, the sites they visit, and the persons they interact with are documented, built into a network diagram and further analyzed. Through this process links and nodes in the enemy’s network emerge. The analysis charts the “social, economic and political networks that underpin and support clandestine networks” identifying key-decision makers and those who support or influence them indirectly. This may mean that analysts will track logistics and money trails, they may identify key facilitators and non-leadership persons of interests and they will exploit human and signals intelligence. They will feed this information into computer systems that help integrate the knowledge and which generate and cross-references thousands of data points to construct a comprehensive picture of the enemy network. “This analysis has the effect of taking a shadowy foe and revealing his physical infrastructure…as a result, the network becomes more visible and vulnerable, thus negating the enemy’s asymmetric advantage of denying a target.”

NETWORK BASED ANALYSIS AND THE KILLING OF “FOOT SOLDIERS”

Viewing targeting in this way demonstrates how **seemingly low level individuals such as couriers and other “middle-men” in decentralized networks such as al Qaeda are oftentimes critical to the successful functioning of the enemy organization**. Targeting these individuals can “destabilize clandestine networks by compromising large sections of the organization, distancing operatives from direct guidance, and impeding organizational communication and function.” Moreover, because clandestine networks rely on social relationships to manage the trade-off between maintaining secrecy and security, attacking key nodes can have a detrimental impact on the enemy’s ability to conduct their operations. Thus, while some individuals may seem insignificant to the outside observer, when considered by an analyst relying on network based analytical techniques, the elimination of a seemingly low level individual might have an important impact on an enemy organization. Moreover, because terrorist networks rely on secrecy in communication, individuals within those networks may forge strong ties that remain dormant for the purposes of operational security. This means that social ties that appear inactive or weak to a casual observer such as an NGO, human rights worker, journalist, or even a target’s family members may in fact be **strong ties within the network**. Furthermore, because terrorist networks oftentimes rely on social connections between charismatic leaders to function, disrupting those lines of communication can significantly impact those networks.

For example, Osama Bin Laden’s courier Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti was Bin Laden’s sole means of communicating with the rest of al Qaeda. To preserve operational security, he is rumored to have kept his relationship with Bin Laden a secret from some of his family members in the Persian Gulf. Once identified, tracking al-Kuwaiti allowed analysts to determine the links and nodes in Bin Laden’s network. Moreover, if the government had chosen to kill al-Kuwaiti, a mere courier, it would have prevented Bin Laden from leading his organization (desynchronizing the network) until Bin Laden could find a trustworthy replacement. Finding such a replacement would be a difficult task considering that al Kuwaiti lived with Bin Laden, and was his trusted courier for years. Of course, sometimes intelligence gained from continuing to monitor a target is more significant than killing or capturing the target (as was initially the case with al Kuwaiti). This is a point that is recognized by **every expert in targeting**. Critics oftentimes accuse the government of not considering the potential intelligence loss associated with killing rather than capturing persons, but that intelligence loss is one that is well known by targeteers. The only issue is that someone deep within the killing process has decided that an operation, when it occurs, is worth the intelligence loss (given the available options).

**Actually causes backlash against AQ and the Taliban – frees up population to fight back**

**Llenza 11** – (2011, Michael, Diplomacy Department, Norwich University, US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, “Targeted Killings in Pakistan: A Defense,” Global Security Studies, Spring, 2011, Volume 2, Issue 2)

In the end, what matters to the policy makers is whether the targeted killings are an effective means of counter-terrorism. The nature of transnational terrorist groups means that large-scale military operations will not be particularly effective against them (Anderson, 2009, p.7). They are few in number, dispersed across several borders and more efficiently targeted through narrower means (ibid.). Although overt warfare is most useful in eliminating a regime that harbors terrorist groups, it is not an effective means of going after the terrorists themselves (ibid.).

A former CIA officer compared the Predator strikes to attacking a beehive one bee at a time, “you can kill some very important bees, but the hive is going to remain (Raddatz, p.42).” **What counter-terrorism specialists are counting on though is that such strikes will eliminate not just the queen bees, but also their most valuable workers**, **those with the knowledge that takes years to acquire**, such as some of the bomb makers and paramilitary specialists who have been killed. While a long list of charismatic leaders willing to take the fight to the U.S. will probably remain, **those who possess the knowledge to actually inflict damage as well as pass on to others the training required to do so, will dwindle**. There is therefore good reason to believe that targeted killings will weaken and demoralize organizations that already suffer from no clear institutional structure (Statman). **Killing such individuals should in the end make it more difficult for the terror machinery to function** (ibid.).

Taliban spokesperson Tariq Azam has stated that their meetings within the FATA no longer take place in direct view of the skies and that they have been forced underground (Khan & Arnoldy). **Citizens of the tribal regions have begun to form armed posses and have torched the homes of Taliban members** and their supporters **as well as destroyed training camps** (ibid.). Still drone strikes are a counter-terrorism option, not a counter insurgency strategy. Drone attacks have empowered the people of the region to act against the Taliban but failure on behalf of the government to stabilize the regions will only result in their return (ibid.)

**Can’t replace lost talent – means no impact**

**Anderson 13** – (5/24, Kenneth, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University Member, Task Force on National Security and Law, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, “The Case for Drones,” Real Clear Politics)

Other critics argue that drone warfare is ineffective because killing one operational commander merely means that another rises to take his place. This is the source of the oft-heard remark that drone warfare is a “whack-a-mole” strategy: Kill one here and another pops up there. Drone warfare is nothing more than a tactic masquerading as a strategy, it is said. Worse, it indulges one of the oldest and most seductive quests of modern military technology, the one that says you can win a war from the air alone.

**The whack-a-mole criticism is wildly overstated and, as a matter of terrorist leadership, simply not true**. Captured terrorist communications show that qualified and experienced operational commanders are not so easy to come by. One can argue that the failure to carry off large-scale attacks in the West is the result of the defensive hardening of targets and better homeland security, which is certainly true; but **culling the ranks of terrorist leaders and the resulting inability to plan another 9/11** is also critical.

## at tech

**Physicists conclude that it’s easy, material is available – terrorist weapons don’t require the same high standards that make regular weapons so complex**

**Zimmerman and Pluta 06** – (2006, Peter, PhD, experimental nuclear and elementary particle physics, Emeritus Professor of Science and Security at King's College London, former Chief Scientist of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Anna, researcher, Center for Science and Security at King's College London, PhD candidate, “Nuclear terrorism: A disheartening dissent,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 48, Issue 2, 2006, taylor and francis)

It seems certain that **at some price nuclear explosive material is available to well funded terrorists, even if there have been no documented incidents** in which nuclear explosive material has been sold in useful quantities. With access to fissile materials, in particular HEU or reasonably clean Pu-239, many authors have claimed that improvised nuclear devices29 are comparatively easy to build.30 The principal physicists who are exponents of the ‘easy-to-build’ idea are Theodore B. Taylor, a former fission-weapons designer at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, and Nobel Laureate Luis Alvarez. Alvarez notably suggested that a nuclear explosion could result if one appropriately sized and shaped piece of U-235 metal were dropped on a second properly sized and shaped piece;31 Taylor, in John McPhee's The Curve of Binding Energy, claimed that, given the material, building a bomb is ‘very easy. **Double underlined. Very easy’**.32 It is likely that both experts spoke somewhat loosely for effect, because at the time they wrote the official position was that no terrorist could build a nuclear device because constructing a nuclear weapon required an effort on the scale of the Manhattan Project together with a team of scientists of the calibre of those at Los Alamos from 1942 to 1945.

Time has shown that states can go nuclear with smaller projects, and certainly with less brilliant scientists. In part this reduction in required effort and talent is because very large amounts of information about the construction of nuclear weapons as well as the fast-reactor physics needed to compute the behaviour of nuclear devices have become public. This publication sometimes occurred deliberately, as in the historic 1954 Atoms for Peaceconference or the 1970s-era International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluationstudy. Sometimes the information oozed out, as in the McPhee book, and sometimes it was effectively re-invented.33 Many details can now be found in the physics literature.34

There are crucial differences between nuclear weapons built by a state for use in a military stockpile and devices constructed by groups for use in single dramatic acts of terror. A military device must be **reliable**(it must explode when detonated); it must be **predictable**(the yield attained must be substantially the same across a complete production run of weapons so that troops using the weapons can choose the one which will best do the job); and it must be **safe**(a military weapon must be safe to handle and not detonate in common accidents; above all it must not detonate with nuclear yield when the detonation has not been authorised).

A bomb built by a terrorist need not be especially reliable, and it certainly need not be particularly predictable. That is, any yield falling somewhere between 100 tonnes (0.1kt) and 20,000 tonnes (ZOkt) of TNT will almost certainly be considered adequate by the terror group concerned. Surely the strike group would prefer a larger yield to a smaller one, all things being equal; but a 100-tonne explosion will be very nearly as effective as a tool of terror as a 20kt one. Most importantly, it will be perceived as nuclear, and it will contaminate a very large area with radioactive fallout (some, of course, being the unfissioned nuclear material itself). We assume that the terror cell will be concerned with its own safety while assembling the device and transporting it to target, but we do not believe that any terrorist group would or even could attempt to reach the safety levels demanded of an American weapon 35

In 1977 the US Congress's Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) studied nuclear proliferation and safeguards. In its report the OTA panel concluded that an appropriate technical team for building an improvised nuclear device was two people, one of whom was a skilled machinist and the other a physicist.36 If the fissile fuel for the device is uranium enriched to 50% or more, this is a plausible, if stressing, scenario that has been explored in some detail in fiction.37

## more at CTS

**data quality is fine – their ev is about the 60’s**

**Weinberg and Eubank 08** – (2008, Leonard, PhD, Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno, senior fellow at the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa, and William, PhD, associate professor of political science, University of Nevada, Reno, “Problems with the critical studies approach to the study of terrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism Volume 1, Issue 2, 2008, taylor and francis)

Is the quality of the data used by terrorism's orthodox investigators as poor as the critics assert. Perhaps it was at one time, but it is no longer the case. The reliance on newspaper accounts and other secondary sources is diminishing. Marc Sageman, for instance, has developed his own database on al-Qaeda's core membership (Sageman 2004, pp. 61–135). A number of researchers have conducted and continue to conduct interviews with individuals involved in terrorist activities in Germany, Italy, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Iraq, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. The family and friends of suicide bombers have been interviewed, as have those who have sent them on their missions. Those who attempted to kill themselves but were apprehended before they could do so have been interviewed in prison. Among the long list of orthodox terrorism researchers who have had these extended and systematic face-to-face encounters, we should mention Nicole Argo, Anat Berko, Mia Bloom, Mohammed Hafez, John Horgan, Ariel Merari, Donatella della Porta, Jerrold Post, the late Ehud Sprinzak, and Yoram Schweitzer. 6 The list is partial and continues to grow. Our understanding of terrorist motivations – what causes them to become radicalised (or de-radicalised) – expands correspondingly.

**Definitional problem is overstated**

**Weinberg and Eubank 08** – (2008, Leonard, PhD, Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno, senior fellow at the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa, and William, PhD, associate professor of political science, University of Nevada, Reno, “Problems with the critical studies approach to the study of terrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism Volume 1, Issue 2, 2008, taylor and francis)

The situation may not be as bleak as it seems at first glance. While there is no consensus as yet, **over the years definitions of terrorism have become more concise and closer together in meaning**. For their 1988 compendium, Schmid and Jongman sought to distil the most common references that appeared in the 109 separable definitions to see what elements they shared most commonly. The result was a single, though complex, definition:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. 28)

This effort to identify the most common elements in the more than 100 definitions submitted by social scientists was, no doubt, a step in the right direction. But it was far too complex and cumbersome to be used for purposes of empirical inquiry.

More recently Boaz Ganor, Bruce Hoffman, Anthony Burke, and others have proposed clearer and simpler definitions. For Ganor, ‘Terrorism is a form of violent struggle in which violence is used deliberately against civilians in order to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious etc.)’ (Ganor 2005, p. 17). Hoffman defines terrorism as ‘the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change’ (Hoffman 1998, p. 43). And for Burke, ‘Terrorism is a form of political violence directed against civilians with a coercive intent that rests on the production of a state of fear or terror’ (Burke 2008, p. 39). The deliberate use of violence against civilians or non-combatants in order to achieve some political objective is, to the best of our knowledge, a widely shared element in most definitions of ‘terrorism’ employed by social scientists in recent years. Also, recently Schmid observed that if terrorist attacks were carried out in wartime they would be regarded as war crimes and those engaged in this type of conduct would or should be subject to prosecution under international conventions governing the rules of war. 2

The failures and flaws detected by researchers already involved in studying terrorism appear quite damning. The field itself seems to rest more on quicksand than firm ground. We ask readers however, to consider another possibility. The study of terrorism over approximately the last 40 years has gone through the same kind of fights, games, and debates as seems common among social scientists when a new subject or topic catches their attention. Rather than being somehow unique, terrorism studies seem to have undergone the same types of struggles as other important and strongly contested concepts in the social sciences. **What we appear to be witnessing then is a perfectly normal process of evolution**; the flaws and failures we have discussed so far would be found in other areas of political inquiry as these areas have changed over time.

**Not a-historical**

**Weinberg and Eubank 08** – (2008, Leonard, PhD, Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno, senior fellow at the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa, and William, PhD, associate professor of political science, University of Nevada, Reno, “Problems with the critical studies approach to the study of terrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism Volume 1, Issue 2, 2008, taylor and francis)

Is the conventional study of terrorism as a-historical as its new critics make it out to be? If we date the renewed interest in the study of terrorism to the 1960s, the years during which terrorist violence appeared in Latin America, the Middle East and the advanced industrialised democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan, did its observers have little regard or understanding of the historical record? This does not appear to be the case. The worldwide outbreak of terrorist violence in the late 1960s was followed by a number of articles and books whose authors stressed the fact that terrorism was by no means a new phenomenon. Walter Laqueur, Albert Parry, and David Rapoport, among others, went on to trace the intellectual and historical manifestations of terrorist violence from the ancient Greek practice of tyrannicide, to the religiously motivated Zealots and Assassins, forward through the ‘reign of terror’ during the French Revolution to the late nineteenth century anarchists, Russian revolutionaries and Irish, Balkan, and Indian nationalists. Laqueur especially went out of his way to emphasise the view that terrorism was hardly new and, for the public, nothing much to worry about (Laqueur 1977, 1978, Parry 1976, Rapoport 1984).

The critical studies advocates may use the term ‘a-historical’ in connection with the orthodox study of terrorism following 9/11. If this is the claim, there certainly may be some truth in it because al-Qaeda and its network in fact, may be unprecedented. Some might argue that in terms of its virtually global spread, the use of the Internet, and the number of people killed, al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-inspired groups are unique and the history of earlier terrorism experiences may be of little relevance. However, if we focus on al-Qaeda and the emergence of Islamic radicalism prior to 9/11, the critical studies claim of a-historicism still does not hold. Giles Kepel, John Esposito, and other analysts have produced a substantial body of work on the philosophical and historical roots of al-Qaeda and its followers (Kepel 2002, 2004, Esposito 1983).